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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
FAIRFIELD IRRIGATION C 0 M-
PANY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
ERNEST CARSON A N D M R S . 
ERNEST CARSON, his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
7670 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS IN ANSWER 
TO RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR 
RE-HEARING AND BRIEF 
The unanimous decision of the Supreme Court having 
determined this case in favor of appellants after full brief-
ing and argument heretofore, the respondent has filed its 
motion for a re-hearing and brief in support thereof. The 
points raised are not only specifically. and fully covered by 
the opinion of this Honorable Court, but have been re-
peatedly raised and argued by respondent throughout this 
proceeding and there is nothing new which is contained in 
its present petition and brief. 
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ALL POINTS HAVE BEEN FULLY CONSIDERED 
For example, the petition is based upon two points: 
that the court erred in holding that the statutes in effect 
prior to 1935 required anyone to make a statutory filing on 
the waters in question in order to appropriate the same, 
and that the court erred in holding that respondent was 
not misled by the change in concept as to public water. Yet 
these contentions were argued during the trial, in all of 
the briefs, at the oral argument and fully covered in the 
court's unanimous opinion. It is true that respondent's 
position thereon has shifted several times but this serves 
to emphasize the error of its contentions and does not de-
tract from the fact that the points already have been fully 
and properly considered. 
There should be some end to argument and some point 
at which a case is submitted and decided. At the oral argu-
ment in this case, counsel for respondent claimed that he 
was taken by surprise by the fact that water originally 
having its source underground loses its identity as under-
ground water after it has been conveyed in a natural 
channel with the natural flow of surface water and sought 
to be diverted from a natural surface channel. The re-
spondent accordingly· asked to file a "Supplemental Brief" 
after the oral argument, which privilege was allowed it. 
It covered in such "Supplemental Brief" following oral 
argument almost the exact point it seeks to cover in its 
· petition for a re-hearing, except that its arguments are 
inconsistent. 
As we pointed out in our answer to its supplemental 
brief, after oral argument, the trial court found upon 
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respondent's original contention that it had appropriated 
the water by diversion from a natural channel as a part 
of a larger stream prior to 1934 and after 1905. Then in 
their supplemental brief, counsel for respondent contended 
that the water in any event when and where it diverted 
it was surface water that could only be appropriated by 
application to the State Engineer. Now, it contends that 
it was underground water which was appropriated by it 
as underground water. 
STATUTE DID NOT REQUIRE FILING ON 
UNDERGROUND WATER AS SUCH, BUT DID 
REQUIRE FILING ON WATER FLOWING IN 
NATURAL CHANNELS IRRESPECTIVE OF 
REMOTE ORIGIN. 
We are led to wonder how respondent can disregard 
the fact pointed out by the opinion of this Court, that the 
Fairfield Irrigation Company never did seek to appropriate 
underground water as such. How, in the face of the record, 
can it blithely argue that it appropriated "underground 
water" as such when the undisputed record is that it simply 
diverted from the natural channel of Fairfield Springs such 
amount of the well waters as were permitted to flow and 
commingle with the spring waters. Just as well say that 
on any surface stream after 1903 there can be an approp-
riation of its water by mere use because some of it some-
where up the stream had its source through springs, seeps, 
wells or otherwise. This fallacious doctrine would destroy 
all of our concepts and make impossible the administration 
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of surface, as well as our underground, water by the State 
Engineer. 
The opinion of this Court completely answers the re-
spondent's present argument by pointing out: 
"Here the respondent did not own the land 
where the artesian basin is located; it did not drill 
the well which diverted the water from the basin; 
it merely diverted such waters from a natural water 
course after they had been permanently diverted 
from the basin by the owners of the land drilling 
an artificial well who had allowed the waters to run 
to waste into a natural channel." 
STATE ENGINEER HAD JURISDICTION OF 
SURF ACE STREAMS FLOWING IN WELL-
DEFINED CHANNELS. 
Respondent on page 2, et seq. of its brief claims "That 
the Court has overlooked the fact that the ·statutes at all 
times prior to 1935 did not purport to give the State Engi-
neer jurisdiction over "underground ,water" and that during 
said period every application on artesian water and per-
colaling water had been rejected. Respondent then argues 
that since the State Engineer did not have jurisdiction 
before 1935 to entertain applications for underground water, 
that officer could not grant applications to appropriate 
water flowing in natural channels on the surface if such 
water sometime before it entered the natural channel had 
a remote origin underground. The whole argument of 
respondent is that it was exactly in the position of appel-
lants in making use of these waters before 1935 which, 
as pointed out in the opinion, is not so. Respondent used 
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the water as a part of a surface stream after that water 
had been commingled with other water. It never sought to 
go beyond the natural channel, it had no connection what-
soever with any underground source. 
The respondent confuses the issue again by arguing 
that Riordan v. lV estwood, 203 P. 2d 922, held in effect 
that underground water had always been public waters. 
The opinion of this Court fully covers this phase as all 
others. Really this changed concept, or whether it should 
be applied before 1935, has nothing to do with the case, 
since there has never been any change in the concept that 
water flowing in well defined channels on the surface must 
be treated as such, and not as underground waters, even 
though such surface waters had a remote origin under-
ground. 
THIS COURT'S DECISION IS SOUND IN 
HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT DID 
NOT COME WITHIN THE DOCTRINE OF 
THE HANSON CASE, WHICH CARSONS DID. 
On page 3 of its brief, respondent argues that "to hold 
that the 1903 statute requiring a filing on ground water 
as the Court has done in the instant case, is to ascribe to 
the Legislature the doing of a useless act in 1935." This 
is an unjustified distortion of the decision in order to set 
up a straw man. This Court did not hold that a filing was 
necessary on u~derground water prior to 1935. It expressly 
held in line with Hanson v. Salt Lake City, 205 P. 2d 255, 
that a filing on underground water was not necessary but 
that mere application to a beneficial use was sufficient and 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
that since the Carsons as owners of the land and the pipe 
directly used said water from the ground as underground 
water, they completed a valid appropriation, whereas the 
Fairfield Irrigation Company, not being the owner of the 
land, never theretofore having asserted any control over 
the underground water source, but merely having diverted 
a portion of the well water from a natural channel after 
it had been permitted by the landowner to run into said 
natural channel over the surface of the ground and com-
mingle with a large amount of other surface water, did 
not make a valid appropriation of that water as under-
ground water. All of the confusion which respondent seeks 
to inject into this case is dissolved if this point is recog-
nized, as this Court has recognized it, and respondent's 
argument is based wholly on its false assumption that the 
Court held that underground water could not be approp-
riated as such by usage. 
RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT CONTRADICTS 
ITSELF. 
On page 4 of its brief, respondent seeks again to con-
fuse the issue by belaboring the point that underground 
water must be considered to always have been ·public waters 
(which makes no difference in the decision of this case), 
but respondent adds: "But only water in known or defined 
channels was placed under the jurisdiction of the State 
Engineer in 1903. The balance of these public waters (both 
on public and private lands) could still be appropriated by 
usage." 
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Again respondent says on page 4 of its brief, "By the 
statute in 1903 he (the State Engineer) was granted jur-
isdiction over streams and other sources of water in known 
or defined channels." Thus even respondent must concede 
that since 1903 water in known or defined channels could 
not be appropriated by mere usage, but that the State 
Engineer in 1903 was granted jurisdiction over streams 
and other sources of water in known and defined channels. 
When it is realized that the record is without dispute, 
and this court has determined, that if there were in fact 
any intention at all to divert the water in question by 
Fairfield Irrigation Company it was from a stream flow-
ing in a known and defined natural channel and that Fair-
field Irrigation Company never made any diversion of the 
water except from such stream flowing in a known and 
defined natural channel, it must be apparent that respond-
ent's entire argument is fallacious and has been properly 
passed upon by this Court in the only manner the law 
permits. 
THE FALLACIOUS DOCTRINE NOW CON-
TENDED FOR BY RESPONDENT WOULD 
THROW ALL WATER RIGHTS INTO CON-
FUSION. 
Respondent continues that "The court has held against 
us because we did not make a statutory filing prior to 1933. 
We assert that none could have been made." It argues 
that a filing would have been rejected. This is a fanciful 
contention and it is not supported by a single case cited 
by respondent; as a matter of fact, several of the cases 
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cited by respondent as we shall see show that the applica-
tion to appropriate streams in natural channels irrespective 
of their remote source has ever since 1903 been considered 
within the jurisdiction of the State Engineer. As a matter 
of fact, between 1903 and 1935 you would eliminate from 
the action of the State Engineer almost every one of the 
numerous applications to appropriate surface streams which 
have been granted, because in almost every instance they 
have had their remote origin in whole or in part under-
ground. 
For instance, Provo River is now over-subscribed but 
there have been numerous applications thereon approved 
and proved up on since 1903. The river during various 
stages of the flow is almost entirely made up by seepage, 
percolating and other underground water, and as a matter 
of fact, there is frequently a water-tight dam maintained 
at Midway, all of the water used in .Utah County frequently 
being made up from return flow, seepage and springs. If 
the respondent is correct, applications to appropriate water 
from Provo River between 1903 and 1935 afforded no jur-
isdiction for action by the State Engineer, or at least would 
be ineffectual to authorize the use of water from this sur-
face stream because it had a remote source underground. 
This would mean that notwithstanding applications filed 
on Provo River between 1903 and 1935 fully subscribing 
for all available water flowing therein, including applica-
tions of the United States Government, a third party now 
could file on various seeps and springs contributing to the 
surface flow on the ground that the natural channel filings 
theretofore made were without jurisdiction and ineffectual. 
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If this were the case, our water rights on every major 
stream in the state would be thrown into hopeless con-
fusion. Yet this is what respondent's argument amounts 
to. If it could not file on the surface water flowing in Fair-
field Springs prior to 1903 because part of it had its remote 
source underground, then all of our surface filings from 
known and defined channels between 1903 and 1935 would 
be in question and in jeopardy. 
THE OPINION OF THE COURT IS PRACTI-
CAL AND SOUND. 
On the other hand, if the decision of this Court is 
correct, as it is, order and justice are given effect. We 
submit that there can be no question of the practicality, 
justice and legality of this Court's determination in this 
case that: 
"Respondent's predecessors did not own the land 
on which the wells are located, nor do they divert 
this water from the artesian basin. The driller of 
the wells diverted the water and later abandoned it 
and allowed it to run to waste into a natural water 
course and to commingle with the natural waters of 
the springs from which respondent's predecessors 
diverted it into their canal to a beneficial use .. There 
is little difference between this situation and the 
case where water, after being once appropriated and 
used, is allowed to escape beyond the control of the 
original appropriator into a natural water course. 
The law is now settled in this state that in such case 
such waters are subject to being again appropriated 
by filing an application and diversion to a beneficial 
use and not otherwise. Justesen v. Olsen, supra; 
Lehi Irri. Co. v. Jones, Utah . . . , 202 P. 2d 892 ; 
McNaughton v. Eaton, ... Utah ... , ... P. 2d .... 
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In those cases only such waters were held to be 
subject to reappropriation as reached the natural 
channel or course from which it could be rediverted 
but the new appropriator could not obtain any· right 
against the original appropriator to require him to 
waste his waters or make them available for use 
under the new appropriation. Lasson v. Seely, ... 
Utah ... , 238 P. 2d 418; Smithfield West Bench 
Irr. Co. v. Union Central Ins. Co., 105 Utah 468, 142 
P. 2d 866, on second appeal 113 Utah 356, 195 P. 
2d 249 ; Crescent Mining Co. v. Silver King Mining 
Company, 17 Utah 444. The difference between those 
cases and this one is that here the waters have been 
abandoned and the original appropriator has lost 
his right to interfere with the appellants' use of t~e 
waters. If the original appropriator had not aban-
doned or by non-user lost his rights to these waters 
and still could make a beneficial use of them and 
could thereby prevent the reappropriator from using 
them, the situation would be the same as in those 
cases. Under our concept of the law of artesian 
basins prior to 1935, no one could by appropriation 
and beneficial use acquire a right to such waters 
as against the owner of the land on which the basin 
was located but if the land owner allowed it to run 
to waste and it found its way to a natural water 
course it could be appropriated in the manner pre-
scribed by law and as against every one but the 
owner of the lands where the basin was located such 
appropriator would obtain the right to the use there-
of. Under ·the new concept, the only difference is 
that such waters are subject to appropriation in 
accordance with the law even as against the land 
owners where the artesian basin is located; it' did 
not drill the well whick diverted the water from the 
basin; it merely diverted such waters from a natural 
water course after they had been permanently di-
verted from the basin by the owner of the land 
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drilling an artificial well who had allowed the waters 
to run to ~vaste into a natural channel. (Emphasis 
ours.) 
"In the Hanson case, supra, we held that the 
right to the use of artesian well waters, which prior 
to 1935 were considered not subject to appropriation 
but by the Wrathall and Justesen cases were held 
to be subject to appropriation, could be acquired 
prior to that time by merely diverting such waters-
to a beneficial use and the filing of an application to 
appropriate was not necessary. In the Hanson case, 
the owner of the land on which the well was located 
had drilled the well and beneficially used the water 
for many years; it did not involve an appropriation 
by a person who was not the owner of the land on 
which the well water was diverted from the artesian 
basin. Since respondent and their predecessors could 
have appropriated these waters in the statutory· 
manner prior to 1935 under the old conception, they 
have not been misled by the old concept into not. 
filing an application to appropriate these waters 
during the time that they used them from 1905 to 
1933 and therefore they do not come under the ex-
ception announced in the Hanson case, and did not 
acquire the right to use these waters prior to 1933.n 
T H E RESPONDENT'S CONTENTION I S 
BASED UPON INCORRECT ASSUMPTIONS. 
On page 6, et seq. of its brief, the respondent contends 
that the cases prior to the Riordan case uniformly held 
that this water could not have been filed on by respondent. 
The decision of this Court cites a number of cases showing· 
that this proposition is not valid, and further, this Court's 
opinion pin-points the very basis of respondent's confusion 
when it shows that the only difference between the new 
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.and old concepts as to public or private water is that under-
ground waters under the new concept are subject to ap-
propriation by application to the State Engineer even as 
.against the landowner where the artesian basin is located. 
Both under the old and new concepts one appropriating 
water from a natural surface channel had to file an appli-
·Cation with the State E'ngineer, but under the old concept 
he could not require the owner of the land to continue to 
let his water run off· and under the new concept, h~ could. 
In either event the appropriator could acquire no rights 
·unless he filed an application with the State Engineer or 
diverted and used the water as unaerground water, rather 
than as a part of a surface stream flowing in a well de-
fined channel. 
The respondent, prior to appellants' appropriation, 
neither filed an application nor diverted and used the water 
from its underground source. It simply diverted the water 
from a natural channel as a part of a larger surface stream 
or water course. If this fact is kept in mind it will be seen 
that not one case has respondent cited which sustains its 
argument. 
RESPONDENT'S AUTHORITIES DO NOT SUP-· 
PORT ITS POSITION. 
We invite attention to the authorities respondent cites 
in an attempt to show that it was misled because up to 
1935 it could not have filed on these surface waters which 
it diverted from the natural channel of the Fairfield 
·.Springs. It has been misled in no way but has, itself, 
.sought to mislead the Carsons by suddenly seeking to de-
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prive them of their water after conceding their ownership 
ever since 1931, and up until shortly before this action was 
filed. 
Willow Creek v. Michaelsen, 21 Utah 248, 60 Pac. 943, 
is referred to. This was decided prior to 1903. It did not 
involve any application to the State Engineer or the ques-
tion of jurisdiction of the State Engineer. It simply held 
that a lower claimant could not force an· upper landowner 
to allow percolating waters to leave the owner's land when 
it could be utilized by the owner. The respondent argues 
that this water could not have been filed on. What the 
cases it cites proves was that this water could have been 
filed on if from a natural channel, but that prior to 1935 
the filing could not have been used to compel its continued 
flow into the natural water course as against the landowner. 
Whether under the old or new concept, however, the re-
spondent could have filed on the water, but it made no 
attempt or claim until long after appellants had validly ap-
propriated the water as underground water. The appellants' 
use, both under the old and new concept, constituted a 
valid appropriation-under the old because it was the land-
owners' water to begin with; under the new concept, be-
cause its application of the waters as underground waters 
to a beneficial use comprised a valid appropriation by 
virtue of the doctrine of the Hanson case. 
Next, respondent cites Crescent Mining Co. v. Silver 
King Mining Co., 17 Utah 444, 54 Pac. 244. In this case, 
decided in 1898, contrary to what respondent says in its 
brief, the user of water from the. natural lake into which 
the developed waters flowed, was held to have appropriated 
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such water as water of a lake or pond, just as respondent 
could have appropriated the water from Fairfield Springs 
by application to the State Engineer, but it was further 
held that such appropriation did not give the lower user 
an easement in the tunnel or the right to have the developed 
water to continue to flow as against the owner of the land 
on which it was developed. Moreover, this did not involve 
in any way the jurisdiction of the State Engineer. The 
only point material to this case is that when the developed 
water flowed into the natural lake it was held subject to 
appropriation as waters flowing in a natural channel, but 
not as underground waters so as to require their continued 
discharge into the lake. Thus, this demonstrates that it 
makes no difference whether the old concept or new con-
cept is applied. Underground waters prior to 1935 did not 
have to be filed on whether considered public or private 
waters, but if they had lost their identity as underground 
waters and had commingled with waters flowing in a nat-
ural water course, they were subject to appropriation. 
Petersen v. Eureka Hill Mining Co., 53 Utah 70, 176 
Pac. 729, is cited by respondent in support of its conten-
tion that developed water prior to 1935 was not under the 
jurisdiction of the State Engineer. This case is not in point 
since there was an attempt not to appropriate water flow-
ing in a well defined natural channel but developed wa~er 
as such. The quotation contained in respondent's brief was 
mere dicta and even this is consistent with this Court's 
opinion. The express holding, however,. is that prior to 
the plaintiff's application, the waters of the spring had 
been fully appropriated by defendant. We quote the portion 
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of the opinion immediately preceding that portion extracted 
by counsel ( p. 730) : 
"* * * Under the facts as found and which 
for the purposes of this opinion must be taken as 
true, the defendant appropriated the waters of the 
spring in question and applied them to a beneficial 
use while the soil upon which the spring was located 
was still a part of the public domain. This it had a 
legal right to do. 2 Kinney, Irrigation, etc. (2d Ed.) 
Para. 648." 
The respondent next cites Deseret Livestock v. 
Hooppiania, 66 Utah 25, 239 Pac. 479, a leading case which 
not only fails to support respondent's position but was ap-
propriately cited by this Court as a foundation of its opin-
ion. We can do no better than to quote respondent's de-
scription of the case (p. 9 of its brief) with our emphasis 
added: 
"* * * In the Deseret Livestock case, twelve 
springs were involved. Several of the springs yielded 
a sufficient flow to form a well defined channeL 
The remainder did not. Deseret made a statutory 
filing on all of the waters, i. e., those which formed 
a channel and those which did not. Hooppiania had 
been using both classes of water prior to the filing. 
As to the water in defined channels, the Court held 
that the filing with the State Engineer prevailed and 
that a filing was indispensable to initiate a right. 
As to the waters which did not form a channel the 
Court held that the filing was ineffectual. In other 
words, the State Engineer was compelled to refuse 
to take jurisdiction over percolating waters." 
Where does this leave the argument of respondent that 
it could not have filed an application with the State Engi-
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neer prior to 1935? Its diversion was out of, from and 
below the natural channel of the Fairfield Spring:s-not at 
the wells, but after the water from the wells had run down 
a channel which the Court found had been cut thereby 
and from there into the Fairfield Spring pond, where they 
commingled with a large amount of other water, and from 
thence into the natural channel of the Fairfield Springs 
from which diversions were made for irrigation. Respond-
ent cannot claim that the spring water itself had to be 
the sole agency in creating the channel. We quote from 
the Hooppiania case (p. 481) : 
"It is very doubtful whether much or any of 
the water of the springs, other than springs No. 11 
and No. 12, ever found its way into any natural 
channel, but it is conceded that whatever water 
from those springs did find its way into either of 
the natural channels had been appropriated and ap-
plied to a beneficial use by the predeces~or in inter-
est of appellant." 
Certainly respondent's use and claim was from a natural 
channel and according to its own statement of the Hoop-
piana case it could have filed its application which was in 
respondent's wordE;, "indispensible to initiate a right." Cer-
tainly Carson's diversion prior to 1935 was not from any 
natural channel but directly from the underground water 
source through their own pi pes. Therein is the deciding 
distinction which respondent seems unable or unwilling 
to recognize. As indicated by the opinion of the Court, the 
Carsons filed their under water claim as a claimant to 
underground water: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
"From December 30, 1933 to August 1, 1937r 
appellants leased these well waters to the Manning 
Gold Mining Company, which pumped the entire 
flow to its mining and milling operations where all 
of such waters were beneficially used. This use com-
menced a little more than a year before the Wrathall 
and Justesen cases and the 1935 statutes and amend-
ments. At the time when these changes in concepts 
occurred, appellants were the owners of the land on 
which the wells were located, they were the owners 
of the pipes and casings of the wells which diverted 
the waters from the artesian basin, and they were-
in possession of the diverting works and actually 
beneficially using the waters through their lessee._ 
Under our concept prior to the 1935 change, they 
had the right to use those waters as they saw fit 
without filing an application to appropriate them 
and they had done everything that the law antici-
pated that they should do iri order to acquire the 
ownership of those waters. On March 23, 1936, 
appellants filed in the State Engineer's Office an 
Underground Water Claim claiming the right to the-
use of these well waters pursuant to S. L. 1935, c. 
105, sec. 100-5-12, thereby fully complying with all 
the statutory provisions in regard to such waters. 
and indicating that they did not intend to abandon 
the right to the use of such waters, and the pumping 
operation to Manning continued for more than a 
year after such filing. * * *" 
The case of Holman v. Christensen, 73 Utah 389, 274 
Pac. 457, is cited with the statement emphasized by re-
spondent that the opinion "* * * did not hold that 
wate.r which was caused to run from the land by other 
than natural means was subject to appropriation." What 
the Supreme Court actually said was, "Other than through 
a natural channel" (P. 459). As a matter of fact the right. 
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to appropriate from a natural channel water arising from 
a spring on private land above was upheld. The Christen-
sen case entirely refutes respondent's reasoning in this case. 
The last case referred to by respondent, Wrathall v. 
Johnson, 86 Utah 50, 40 P. 2d 755, does not support re-
spondent's contention and this Court in its opinion takes 
proper notice thereof. 
RESPONDENT IN NO WAY MISLED 
Respondent was in no sense misled. It did not intend 
to claim any underground water. It filed no underground 
water claim. Its officers and all involved made no conten-
tion whatsoever that they had any interest in the wells and 
conceded the rights and use of the Carsons, and the first 
.suggestion of any claim by the irrigation company of the 
wells was shortly before this action commenced (Tr. 33-34, 
54-55, 72, 89, 94, 179, 188-192, 201, 204, 219, 275-276, 298-
301, 334, 336-337, 269, 273, 394-395; defendants' ex. 1, 6, 
14; probate file 5366) . Not only was the respondent not 
misled, but by acquiescence in Carson's ownership of the 
waters for over twenty years has established that its pres-
ent efforts to appropriate the water are a mere after-
thought. 
The company's argument that it could not have ap-
propriated the waters prior to 1935 and that therefore the 
Carsons, contrary to the Hanson case should be denied the 
water notwithstanding that they did everything which the 
Hanson case says they should have done to complete an 
appropriation of underground water would serve merely to 
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deprive a rightful owner because the respondent did not 
bring himself within the rule on which the owner's right 
is based. If respondent had paid for the wells, bought the 
land and pipe, used the water from the well as underground 
water and filed its underground water claim as did the 
Carsons, it could now claim with some logic that the same 
rule applied to it as to the Carsons. It should not be per-
mitted to work the same result by its present argument. 
UNDER NEITHER THE OLD OR NEW CON-
CEPT CAN RESPONDENT PREVAIL. 
Respondent convinced the trial court and argued on 
appeal in the first instance that we must treat our present 
concepts the same as if they had always existed, and now 
goes right back to the early cases in an effort to entirely 
destroy any such result but to establish that percolating 
water belongs to the owner of the soil and was not subject 
to appropriation prior to the changing of our concepts 
in 1935. The trouble with its position is that if we go back 
to the old concept, it cannot succeed because Carsons then 
would own the water as owners of the soil. And if we do 
not go back to the old concept, it cannot succeed because I / . 
Carsons were the first after the water was abandoned by 
Sunshine Water Co. subsequent to 1905, who diverted and 
used the water as underground water and thus appropri-
ated it in the manner recognized at that time, and, in the 
manner recognized in the Hanson case. 
Respondent has cited cases involving springs in an 
attempt to show that it could not have filed an application 
to appropriate water after it entered the spring channel. 
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Does respondent contend that Fairfield Spring was not 
subject to appropriation by usage prior to 1903 as it seems 
to· argue that the Michaelson case indicates? If its argu-
ment is correct, it never did acquire title to the six or 
seven second feet comprising Fairfield Springs and it has 
for these many years belonged to the owners of the soil on 
which the springs arise-Carsons. If the Carsons were as 
determined to cause trouble for the irrigation company on 
its rights as the irrigation company is to cause trouble to 
them on theirs, the Carsons could take respondent's own 
argument and make a very good case that they own all of 
the Fairfield Springs. This just goes to show the sound-
ness of this Court's determination, and the difficulty and 
confusion that the respondent's position would entail. We 
qo not deny that prior to 1903 the predecessors of the com-
pany perfected a diligence right by appropriation from the 
natural channel below Fairfield Springs. It cannot claim 
that its predecessors could make an appropriation by dili-
gence prior to 1903 from the natural channel below the 
spring and then convincingly argue that it could not have 
filed an application based on a diversion from the same 
channel after 1903. 
Every consideration has been given to respondent's 
shifting arguments. Any modification of the present opin-
ion would add confusion to a sound, able and practical inN 
terpretation of the law. Any departure from it as urged 
by respondent would throw our water rights into question, 
as well as the Utah water law into confusion. 
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CONCLUSION 
' Perhaps any argument other than to refer to the opin-
ion of the Court has been superfluous. The opinion speaks 
for itself. The decision of the Court is wholly consistent 
with prior adjudications and in furtherance of justice. To 
adopt respondent's changing arguments in its stead would 
throw most water rights into confusion, including perhaps 
respondent's own proper rights in the Fairfield Springs 
and would work a positive wrong against the Carsons who 
have already been subjected too long to grief and expense, 
which they can ill afford, in standing up for their rights 
in these small wells. 
Respondent's petition for rehearing should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. SHERMAN CHRISTENSON, 
CHRISTENSON AND 
CHRISTENSON, 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
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